Half-truths and the Liar

A half-truth may be defined as a sentence that is true in one sense, but that fails to be true in another, hence as a sentence only true to some extent. This paper discusses some aspects in which the Liar may be considered a half-truth. Talk of half-truths, like talk of half-full containers, implies that truth is gradable, and moreover that some sentences can be true without being perfectly true. I review some evidence for the view that ``true'' and ``false'' are absolute gradable adjectives, and argue that both are moreover systematically ambiguous between a total and a partial interpretation supporting the strict-tolerant distinction. I use this evidence to revisit the strict-tolerant account of truth and the Liar. While the strict-tolerant account was originally conceived for vague predicates, its extension to the semantic paradoxes assumed that assertion, but not truth, comes in different degrees. I reconsider this claim, and argue that we get a more unified picture by treating ``true'' as a special type of vague predicate.