NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMY AND THE ALLOCATION OF BLAME IN POLAND'S SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM.

Background and Hypotheses The literature that has sought to explain the affects of the economy on voting is extensive. Through exhaustive research, political scientists have empirically demonstrated that economic factors affect not only the decision to vote, but also for whom to vote. Surprisingly the vigor with which political scientists have attempted to garner such information has not carried over to non-Western democracies. I find this curious, as it seems there is a wealth of valuable and enlightening information regarding democratic government that is going unexplored, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. For the purpose of this article, I focus on Poland, and more precisely on the offices of the prime minister and the president. In part, Poland has been chosen because it provides a very interesting case study regarding the struggle for post-communist power between the executive and the legislative branches. This struggle has been enhanced by the fact that the country adopted a form of government which is semi-presidential in nature. In semi-presidential regimes the executive combines a directly elected president with a government that is responsible to the legislative body (parliament). Although Poland's strongly parliamentary nature, as declared while it was under communist rule by its 1952 constitution, was preserved, new powers entrusted in the executive branch made the Polish system more like the French Fifth Republic. This arrangement has led to an antagonistic system of government, with the legislative and executive branches vying for the support of the electorate at the other's expense. However, winning the support of the electorate, also entails being held responsible for the country's problems. This is especially true in times of economic turmoil. In this article, I not only evaluate the affects of economic turmoil on the electorates' attitude towards democracy in Poland, but also I attempt to determine more accurately whom the electorate holds accountable during periods of economic stress in the new fledgling democracy. Thus, I intend to focus on three distinct situations: