British Air Control: A Model for the Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict?

Abstract : The doctrinal inertia resulting from 40 years of preparing for war with the Soviet Union, combined with several 'lessons learned' from the air campaign in Operation Desert Storm, has led some air power advocates to overstate the role of air power in future military contests. Belief in the 'primacy of air power' creates an intellectual environment in which an air doctrine similar to that employed by the British to administer its colonies during the interwar years (1918-39) might prove appealing as a means to solve future conflicts, especially those categorized as low-intensity conflict (LIC). However similar the domestic and geostrategic positions of a post-World War I Britain and a post-cold war United States, the military objectives of British colonial rule were much different from those appropriate for the successful resolution of modern low-intensity conflicts. Employing air power in a manner similar to how it was used in British colonies and mandates, known as air control, is unsuitable as a means to bring about lasting solutions in today's low-intensity environment because this method ignores the sociopolitical nature of LIC.