Turkiye’de 2001 ve 2009 Krizlerinde Sabit Sermaye Buyumesindeki Kayiplar ve Bu Kayiplarin Potansiyel GSYH’ye Etkisi

[TR] Ekonomik krizlerde yatirimlar azalmakta, sermaye stogunun (ve dolayisiyla uretim kapasitesinin) buyume hizi yavaslamaktadir. Bu not anilan yavaslamayi 2001 ve 2009 krizleri icin incelemektedir. Orneklem doneminde ortalama yillik %5,1 olan sermaye buyume hizi her iki krizde belirgin sekilde bu seviyenin altina dusmus, ancak 2001 krizindeki dusus daha belirgin olmustur. Bu ortalama alti buyumelerden kaynaklanan birikimli sermaye kaybi 2001 krizinde egilim seviyesinin %11’i civarinda iken 2009 krizinde %4’u civarindadir. Bu kayiplarin neden oldugu potansiyel GSYH kaybi ise 2001 krizinde GSYH’nin %6’si, 2009 krizinde %2’si civarinda olmustur. Anilan kayiplarin kriz sonrasi telafileri de 2009 krizi icin daha olumlu gelismistir. 2001 krizindeki kayip dorduncu yilda daha yeni telafi edilmeye baslanmisken, 2009 krizindeki kayip ayni donemde ucte iki civarinda telafi edilmistir. 2009 krizinden geriye kalan potansiyel kaybi GSYH’nin %1’i civarinda tahmin edilmektedir. Sonuc olarak, potansiyel GSYH’ye yatirim azalmasindan gelen olumsuz etki 2001 krizinde onemli iken, bu etki 2009 krizinde sinirli kalmis, bu durum toparlanma doneminde “asiri isinma” olmamasinda onemli rol oynamistir. [EN] In economic crises, investments decline and the growth of the capital stock (and thereby potential GDP) slows down. This note estimates the extent of that slowdown in the Turkish crises of 2001 and 2009. Capital growth fell significantly in both crises below its 1987-2011 average, but the fall in the 2001 crisis was deeper and much more persistent. The accumulated loss of capital growth arising from those two episodes of below-average growth is about 11% and 4% (of the trend level), respectively, in the 2001 and 2009 crises. The corresponding potential GDP losses are 6% and 2% of GDP, respectively. The loss in 2009, in addition to being smaller, tended to recover much faster than in 2001. In the 4th year after the onset of crisis, the 2009 crisis loss had been recovered by about two-thirds, while the recovery of the 2001 crisis loss had barely begun. The remaining potential GDP loss (due to investment slowdown) from the 2009 crisis is currently less than 1%. Thus, the negative effect of investment slowdown on potential GDP, which was substantial in the 2001 crisis, was limited in the 2009 crisis. This played an important role in ensuring that the rapid recovery after the 2009 crisis did not cause “overheating”.