UGV: security analysis of subsystem control network
2013
Unmanned Ground vehicles (UGVs) are becoming prolific in the heterogeneous superset of robotic platforms. The
sensors which provide odometry, localization, perception, and vehicle diagnostics are fused to give the robotic platform
a sense of the environment it is traversing. The automotive industry CAN bus has dominated the industry due to the
fault tolerance and the message structure allowing high priority messages to reach the desired node in a real time
environment. UGVs are being researched and produced at an accelerated rate to preform arduous, repetitive, and
dangerous missions that are associated with a military action in a protracted conflict. The technology and applications of
the research will inevitably be turned into dual-use platforms to aid civil agencies in the performance of their various
operations. Our motivation is security of the holistic system; however as subsystems are outsourced in the design, the
overall security of the system may be diminished. We will focus on the CAN bus topology and the vulnerabilities
introduced in UGVs and recognizable security vulnerabilities that are inherent in the communications architecture. We
will show how data can be extracted from an add-on CAN bus that can be customized to monitor subsystems. The
information can be altered or spoofed to force the vehicle to exhibit unwanted actions or render the UGV unusable for
the designed mission. The military relies heavily on technology to maintain information dominance, and the security of
the information introduced onto the network by UGVs must be safeguarded from vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
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