Poder nacional, proceso político y violencia : una lectura a partir de la estrategia militar moderna

The clausewitzian perspective of the centers of gravity, represented as centers of power in the midst of war, around which the opposing parties direct their efforts to consolidate and subdue the adversary, presents a theoretical validity to analyze politically the Colombian internal armed conflict, evidencing the continuity and validity of the concept developed by Cari Philipp Gottlieb Von Clausewitz against the dynamics developed by the Colombian State and an insurgent group. In this context, the national strategy, through the military strategy for the Colombian case, contributed to the construction of a favorable stage, even within the military organization itself, intervening individual behaviors, making possible the elaboration of a sustained dialogue in the middle of the continuity of hostile activities and prolonged until 2016, between the Colombian government and the subversive group identified as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) FARC. This process, decided politically from 2012, allowed the National Army to elaborate a methodological process, which through an institutional design, led it to elaborate planning documentary tools and develop a systemic analysis, to interpret the nature of the dialogue with the group subversive and provide the State with the necessary security conditions to discuss the points previously agreed with the FARC.