Los determinantes electorales y partidarios de la beligerancia popular en las provincias argentinas, 1993-2007

espanolLa literatura que versa sobre la relacion entre instituciones y ciclos de beligerancia popular en America Latina afirma que democracias con instituciones politicas debiles son mas propensas al conflicto social. Sin embargo, esta literatura se limita a hacer comparaciones entre paises y no explica las variaciones territoriales de la protesta social que existen al interior de un mismo regimen democratico. Asimismo, la misma se concentra en factores macroinstitucionales y omite los incentivos de elites politicas y partidos politicos para desmovilizar o fomentar episodios de protesta. Nuestro articulo aborda estas problematicas y examina los determinantes electorales y partidarios de la protesta en las veintitres provincias argentinas y la Ciudad de Buenos Aires en 1993-2007. Los hallazgos de nuestro analisis empirico revelan que los incentivos electorales de la competencia politica provincial y el rol del peronismo en la oposicion modelan los patrones geograficos de la protesta a nivel subnacional. EnglishA body of literature on the relationship between institutions and cycles of popular contention in Latin America stresses that democracies with weak political institutions are more prone to social conflict. However, this literature is limited to cross-country comparisons and does not explain the territorial variations of protest activity within the same democratic regime. Moreover, it focuses on macro-institutional factors and overlooks the incentives of political elites and political parties to demobilize or encourage episodes of protest. Our article addresses these issues and examines the electoral and partisan determinants of societal protest in Argentina’s twenty-three provinces and the City of Buenos Aires in 1993- 2007. The findings of our empirical analysis reveal that the incentives created by provincial electoral competition and the influence of the Peronist Party as an opposition party both shape the geographic unevenness of subnational protest activity in the country.