Radioactive Waste Storage/Disposal Policy: A Paradigm for Homeland Security and Energy Security

The inability of U.S. policymakers to come to grips with the problem of what to do with the growing stockpiles of highly radioactive waste has both homeland security and energy security overtones. This paper presents a theoretical framework for assessing homeland security and energy security concerns associated with spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste by categorizing the risks related to the current on-site storage regime, centralized interim storage, and long-term disposal. At the same time, the political ramifications for each storage/disposal regime is assessed. While homeland security and energy security concerns should govern highly radioactive waste policymaking, in reality, political considerations are the primary driving force behind policy decisions. The problem of highly radioactive waste storage/disposal has become one of the most controversial aspects of nuclear technology. Because the issue has become so contentious and politicized, it has been difficult for U.S. policymakers to develop a broad consensus on how best to cope with the ever-increasing amounts of radioactive waste being generated. As a result, radioactive waste storage/disposal policy initiatives have been slow to develop, forcing the operators of commercial nuclear reactors and DOE facilities to store both spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste on-site at numerous plants and facilities across the country. 1