Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders' decision-making behaviours in construction and demolition waste management

Abstract Continuing industrial development has created large quantities of construction and demolition (C&D) waste, which has led to severe environmental and social problems. The aim of this study was to investigate the decision-making behaviours of stakeholders involved in C&D waste management. Based on evolutionary game theory, stakeholder decision-making behaviours in C&D waste management were analysed, and their influencing factors were identified, including government supervision costs, public participation costs, government penalties, government incentives, government supervisory intensity, probability of contractors conducting illegal dumping, probability of public participation, and probability of illegal dumping being detected. The results also revealed how government penalties and incentives impacted the decision-making behaviours of the contractors and public. Penalties and incentives can effectively reduce illegal C&D waste dumping behaviours, while excessive penalties and incentives have limitations in controlling illegal dumping. The model proposed in this research provides an experimental simulation platform to determine the appropriate values for government penalties and incentives for C&D waste management based on stakeholder decision-making behaviours. In addition, the research results for the stable strategy point of a three-party evolutionary game model demonstrated the importance of public participation in C&D waste management. These results may inform research hypotheses for future empirical studies and provide a simple model for developing appropriate government penalties and incentives in practice.