Distributed renewable energy allocation for cellular backhaul with price sensitive users

This paper considers the problem of renewable energy allocation for a cellular backhaul network where the wireless operator can request renewable energy from multiple renewable power suppliers (RPSs) to serve the end users. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game between the leader (the wireless operator) and multiple followers (RPSs). Efficient distributed algorithms are proposed to find the RPSs' unique equilibrium pricing scheme and the operator's optimal energy storage and service price decisions. Our analysis provides the important observation that direct competition between RPSs on the same backhaul node will induce the operator to store more energy and can thus improve the revenues of both the operator and the RPSs. Furthermore, we consider that RPSs along the backhaul may form coalitions when they sell energy to the wireless operator. A distributed algorithm is proposed to obtain the Nash stable coalition structure and the corresponding energy pricing strategy for each coalition. Finally, simulation results are presented to compare the solutions of the competitive model and the cooperative model. We show that forming coalitions between RPSs benefits both the RPSs and the operator.