OnGameTheoretic Rate-Maximizing Packet Scheduling inNon-Cooperative Wireless Networks

because thewireless device's software couldbe modified bytheuser, thanks totheproliferation of Inmanypractical scenarios, wireless devices are open-source software technologies. autonomous and thus,may exhibit non-cooperativeThereissomerelated workdoneintheanalysis of behaviors duetoself interests. Forinstance, awireless user theselfish behaviorin wireless systems[1,2]. mayreport boguschannel information inorder togain However, tothebestofourknowledge, theimpact of resource allocation advantages. Inthis paper, weanalyzed non-cooperative behaviors on wirelesspacket theimpact ofthese rationally selfish andnon-cooperative behaviors on theperformance ofpacket schedulingscheduling isarelativelyunexploredresearchproblem. algorithms intime-slotted wireless networks. Using amixed Inthis paper, wefocus ontheissue ofratemaximizing strategy gametheoretic model, wefound that thetraditional packet scheduling forselfish andrational mobile nodes rate maximizing packet scheduling algorithms canlead non- inanon-cooperative environment. Byselfish, wemean cooperative devices toundesirable Nashequilibria, inwhich themobilenodescareessentially abouttheir own thewireless channel isusedinefficiently. Motivated bythis observation, weproposed anovel gametheoretic schedulingben throutayc rationaaboutathe overll approach that canlead tomoreefficient equilibria where all systemthroughput. By rational, we meana mobile competing devices canachieve higher rates. nodemaynotreport itsSINRormaximal achievable data rate solely based onits real channel condition. In