How Does the Decentralization of Political Manipulation Strengthen National Electoral Authoritarian Regimes? Evidence from the Case of Mexico

How does the structure of decision-making about electoral manipulation affect support for national electoral authoritarian regimes? Following the logic of economic decentralization for efficient policy delivery in democratic settings, I argue that the devolution of responsibility for strategizing and executing political manipulation to subnational regime officials raises its efficiency and thus effectiveness in ensuring regime support, as long as subnational leaders face a credible threat that poorly chosen strategies will undermine their political careers. I test this argument on electoral authoritarian Mexico using a unique database that allows the separation of districts into decentralized and centralized manipulation structures. Statistical analysis using linear regression and electoral forensics methods provides support for the argument that decentralized electoral manipulation raises support for the regime as well as allows subnational officials to engage in a wider variety of techniques to this end, thereby increasing the benefits of electoral manipulation for the national electoral authoritarian regime.