The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did

Abstract : Since the end of the Cold War a decade ago, the armed forces of the United States have been committed to protracted, large-scale combat operations only twice: Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Allied Force in 1999. In both conflicts, U.S. and allied air operations played a key role in securing allied war aims with minimal friendly casualties. Because U.S. military and civilian leaders will also want to conclude future conflicts at minimal cost, it is important that they understand the circumstances and operational effects that were instrumental in producing the successful outcomes of the past. This book examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Among other issues, the study analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures and the resulting expectations and concerns that most heavily influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. Because bombing was the primary instrument used by the NATO allies, particular attention is necessarily given to identifying and assessing its different coercive effects on the Serb population and leadership.