Why is the Notion of Person also Descriptively Problematic

Informally and on occasions formally, the notion of person seems to be indispensable in many walks of life. In philosophical debates, though, the notion oftentimes appears to play a subordinate role. Other notions--subject, self, individual, human being, or characteristic marks of persons: mind, consciousness, rationality, (individual or cultural) identity, autonomy, authenticity, responsibility-- occupy center stage. There are exceptions: there is the venerable problem of personal identity through time; in certain ethical issues, e.g., in bioethics or political philosophy, conceptions of person figure explicitly; and there are some treatises of the "concept of person" itself. Yet, even here one can hear warnings, e.g., that the concept is fraught with dilemmas and should be avoided in bioethical debates (Birnbacher 1997), or warnings concerning the "vagueness" (Wils 1997, 37) or the "contemporary crisis" of the concept (Kobusch 1997, 263ff.).