DepenDNS: Dependable Mechanism against DNS Cache Poisoning

DNS cache poisoning attacks have been proposed for a long time. In 2008, Kaminsky enhanced the attacks to be powerful based on nonce query method. By leveraging Kaminsky's attack, phishing becomes large-scale since victims are hard to detect attacks. Hence, DNS cache poisoning is a serious threat in the current DNS infrastructure. In this paper, we propose a countermeasure, DepenDNS, to prevent from cache poisoning attacks. DepenDNS queries multiple resolvers concurrently to verify an trustworthy answer while users perform payment transactions, e.g., auction, banking. Without modifying any resolver or authority server, DepenDNS is conveniently deployed on client side. In the end of paper, we conduct several experiments on DepenDNS to show its efficiency. We believe DepenDNS is a comprehensive solution against cache poisoning attacks.