La idea de verdad en Kuhn

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the idea of truth in Kuhn by tracing the evolution of this problem from The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to his last articles in the '90s. Three theses are hereby established: 1) Kuhn gives up the idea of truth as a correspondence between sentences and reality that is independent of mind. 2) He posits something like a redundancy theory of truth. 3) In his conception, the aim of knowledge development is not the attainment of truth. Regarding the first thesis, this paper proves that the world which scientific theories attempt to describe, explain and predict is a constituted reality and not the world per se. Consequently, Kuhn is defined as an anti-realistic thinker. The second thesis explores his reasons for giving up the correspondence theory which originate in Kuhn's rejection of Foundationalism, particularly in his postulation of a historical and evolutionary approach to scientific knowledge.The paper evaluates the influence of Hacking's doctrine of styles of reasoning on Kuhn's relativism and on his adoption of a redundancy theory. Lastly, it concludes that according to Kuhn, the idea of truth does not represent a value to be pursued (an epistemological virtue): his vision follows of his denial of the existence of truth as an absolute property of sentences.