Impartiality, the bedrock of the judge’s authority. Philosophical approaches

The judge’s authority is often threatened by the subjectivity of the decisions handed down, which it is claimed are subject to an imperative of impartiality. From a philosophical point of view, impartiality, which is linked to the judge's position as a third party, depends on his or her ability to set aside subjectivity, personal opinions and beliefs, as well as feelings and emotions which could influence his or her decision-making in an arbitrary way. This impartiality is seen by the rationalist tradition as a distancing from the body and its weaknesses: it is about judging as a pure spirit (Plato) or an inanimate object (Montesquieu). There are two traditions that challenge this conception of impartiality: according to empiricists, n° judgment is possible from above without feeling or emotion (Hume); according to sceptics, the purported impartiality of the judge is a smokescreen that hides the power held by judges and above all, the arbitrary nature of their decisions (Montaigne). Contemporary thinkers like Hannah Arendt have attempted to reconcile the imperative of rationality and the recourse to feelings and imagination in seeking to judge well, arriving at a notion of impartiality that is not ontological, but seen as turning critical scrutiny on oneself.