Deprivation of liberty and end of life: Does die with dignity mean to die free?

2014 
Summary More than 10 years after the establishment of the law of 4 March 2002 on patientsrights and quality of health system, the application of one of its measures, suspension of sentence for medical reasons, remains poor. This arrangement should enable inmates with serious diseases to benefit from a release to be cared for and die free. The low effectiveness of the measure questioned its necessity and sufficiency to meet the goal of a dignified end of life. There are two opposing views regarding its necessity. For proponents of Kantian inherent dignity, detainee's release is not a prerequisite to a dignified end of life. Conversely, it becomes necessary when one adheres to a modern vision of autonomy and ‘good death’, defined by the expression of their own will. Anyway, caregivers are not responsible for the decision to grant the release, but participate daily to a third way. The terminally ill prisoner is particularly vulnerable. Serious illness affects drastically the identity and lifestyle, individualization factors already weathered by years of detention. Attention and kindness of the caregiver involved in restoring the deteriorated autonomy of the patient in the twilight of his/her life. Only acceptance of our responsibility towards this person, even transgressive, can promote more than the application of the law, the defence of the dignity of the terminally ill prisoner.
    • Correction
    • Source
    • Cite
    • Save
    • Machine Reading By IdeaReader
    7
    References
    3
    Citations
    NaN
    KQI
    []