Selection of Optimal Strategy for Moving Target Defense Based on Signal Game

This paper analyzes the dynamic and incomplete information characteristics of network offensive and defensive confrontation. In this paper, a signal game is used as the framework, and the defender is used as the signal initiator. The defensive behavior model that induces the signal to interfere with the attack is used to construct the moving target defense of the signal game. Considering the unavoidable misdetection defects of the defense detection system itself, a method for quantifying the benefits of the attack strategy and the defense strategy is proposed, and a refined Bayesian equilibrium algorithm and a prior belief correction algorithm are given. The optimal defense strategy and the optimal induced signal strategy were selected through the relative defense gains and refined Bayesian equilibrium results, respectively. Finally, an example is used to illustrate and verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model and method. Based on the analysis of experimental data, general rules are summarized.