The Ethics of the "Lettres Morales" and Rousseau's Philosophical Project

During the winter of 1757-58, Jean-Jacques Rousseau composed the six letters known as the Lettres morales, which were never sent to their intended addressee, Elisabeth-Sophie-Franeoise Lalive de Bellegarde, the comtesse d'Houdetot.' Setting out, in Rousseau's own words, the principles or rules of his moral teaching,2 these letters disclose a vision of spiritual progress toward a unifying state of happiness and wellbeing which, Rousseau affirms, constitutes the proper end of human life ("l'object de la vie est la f6licite de l'homme," 4:1087). Despite such authorial declarations, the letters have not only failed to attract the critical scrutiny they deserve, they have also been largely misunderstood when attended to. Commentators may frequently allude to them en passant, but such references serve principally to chart the destiny of metaphysical and theistic positions elaborated beyond the text in question. The ancillary status widely conferred on these writings stems from the long-standing view that they represent a set of gestating, incomplete religious and philosophical positions still too "naive" in themselves, which must await re-embodiment in the meditations of the Profession defoi in Emile (1762) to emerge as coherent and mature theses. 3