Negotiating the Superfund: Are Environmental Protection Agency regional officials willing to bargain with states?

Abstract Negotiation and bargaining are important activities in the implementation of intergovernmental public policies. Given the design of environmental policy, intergovernmental negotiations are an essential part of the interaction of environmental program managers. This study examines the willingness of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regional officials to bargain with their state counterparts in the national Superfund program. A model of working relationships is developed to analyze the negotiating behavior of regional EPA officials. The findings of this study indicate that both strategic (trust, involvement) and structural (relations with EPA headquarters, state program capacity, and state political context) factors are associated with whether or not regional officials are willing to negotiate with state-level administrators. The implications of these findings for the national Superfund program, the larger context of intergovernmental management, and larger themes in public administration are discussed in the conclusion of this paper.