Cognitive theories as reinforcement history surrogates: The case of likelihood ratio models of human recognition memory

B. F. Skinner (1977) once argued that cognitive theories are essentially surrogates for the organism’s (usually unknown) reinforcement history. In this article, we argue that this notion applies rather directly to a class of likelihood ratio models of human recognition memory. The point is not that such models are fundamentally flawed or that they are not useful and should be abandoned. Instead, the point is that the role of reinforcement history in shaping memory decisions could help to explain what otherwise must be explained by assuming that subjects are inexplicably endowed with the relevant distributional information and computational abilities. To the degree that a role for an organism’s reinforcement history is appreciated, the importance of animal memory research in understanding human memory comes into clearer focus. As Skinner was also fond of pointing out, it is only in the animal laboratory that an organism’s history of reinforcement can be precisely controlled and its effects on behavior clearly understood.