La pérdida del yo en el giro lingüístico

Hume's criticism of the concept of self has been carried on in analytical philosophy by an analysis of language which shows a confusion due to a misunderstanding of the use of the word I'. Thus, Wittgenstein defended that the pronoun I' can be removed from language because it suggests a false subject of mental states. Russell, on the contrary, believed that there is some probability, but not certainty, that each person is familiarized with his self. Later, the idea that the word I' does not name anything reappeared in Ryle. Finally, Strawson has argued that the subject of properties, corporeal or mental, is the person, the concept of self being secondary. Not far from Strawson's position my thesis is that the word I' Indicates the personal perspective from which mental states and actions appear in the making, and this intuition was first exposed by Ortega y Gasset.