Independent Directors in Corporate Governance: A Comparative Study between the US, New Zealand and China

Conventional wisdom holds that independent directors can improve corporate governance in publicly traded corporations. This author argues that independent directors may play an important role in improving corporate governance in theory but not in reality and the inefficiency of independent directors lends no benefit to sound corporate governance no matter what kind of corporate governance model is adopted, either the Anglo-American unitary model or the Chinese hybrid model. Thus, to evaluate the role of independent directors in corporate governance is the subject of this PhD project. The purpose is to find out whether a sound system of independent directors, especially in the case of Chinese practice, will lead to good corporate governance. Evaluation is carried out by way of a combined research methodology of a comparative study in corporate law between the US, New Zealand and China, where independent directors are in place in publicly traded corporations, and a meta-empirical study in corporate governance with focus on independent directors and corporate performance in Chinese listed companies. The comparative study in corporate law conducted by this research has examined the role of independent directors in corporate governance in the United States, New Zealand and China, which investigates not only the evolution and development of corporate governance and independent directors but also ownership structure, the board of directors, board independence and the supervisory board in connection with the role of independent directors in corporate governance in the targeted jurisdictions. The meta-empirical study reviews and generalizes the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between independent directors and corporate performance in Chinese listed companies. The main finding presented in this research reveals that the transplantation of independent directors from the unitary board model in corporate America into the two-tier board model in corporate China is a misfit in the form of the hybrid board model in China. This suggests that there is a need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the monitoring role of independent directors in corporate governance in Chinese listed companies, bearing in mind the fact that independent directors are a given in the current corporate governance system in China.