Bhat : t : aR amakan : t ha's Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasam : vedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakõ¯rti's Exposition of the Concept

The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self- awareness (svasam : vedana) when it was appropriated by Saiva Siddhanta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second sec- tion examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition (ahampratyaya). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Ramakan : tha ('reflexive awareness') and a kind elaborated by Dharmako¯rti ('intentional self-awareness'). It is then pointed out that Dharmako ¯rti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmako¯rtian Buddhism are of- fered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anatmavada, the doctrine of no-self, and sakaravada, the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Ramakan : tha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmako ¯rti's contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself.