Individuell autonomi och den aktiva staten

Individual Autonomy and State Perfectionism. The liberal state, it has been argued, must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. Honouring individual autonomy and embodying ideals such as fairness and impartiality, the doctrine of state neutrality is intuitively appealing. Working as a restraint for state actions it is however problem­ atic. In this paper, a possible solution to this predicament is outlined. Drawing on the distinction between liberty and what gives worth to liberty, it is argued that we must never accept non-neutral restrictions of liberty itself, but may pursue non-neutral pol­ icies affecting the distribution of what gives worth to liberty and may impose taxes funding non-neutral state actions, although such taxation inevitable limits the worth of our liberty. It is suggested that we, by adopting such a policy of limited state per­ fectionism, can recognize the right to individual autonomy without having to restrain the state from doing the good it can. 1. Inledning Staten kan vara antingen neutral eller perfektionistisk. Fran framst liberalt hall fore­ sprakas neutralitet, det vill saga att den forda politiken ska forhalla sig neutral till olika uppfattningar av vad som ar bra, efterstravansvart eller oumbarligt, eller som jag ha­ danefter kommer att uttrycka mig, till olika uppfattningar av det goda. Staten forvan­ tas skydda medborgarna och omfordela resurser i syfte att korrigera moraliskt god­ tyckliga ojamlikheter, men tillats inte bedriva en politik som uppmuntrar eller motar­ betar specifika livsval. Staten forvantas istallet tillhandahalla en opartisk arena dar manniskor pa egen hand kan realisera sina livsprojekt (Kymlicka 1989a: 883-886). Fo­ resprakarna for statlig perfektionism argumenterar istallet for att staten ska ta stall­ ning mellan olika livsprojekt och fora en aktiv politik i syfte att framja vissa projekt framfor andra. Perfektionistiska argument skiljer sig at saval vad avser syfte som mo