Prenatal Association between a Chemosensory Cue (Cineole) and Ethanol Postabsortive Effects Modulates Later Operant Responsiveness to Cineole-Flavored Milk in 1 Day Old Rats

La introduccion del concepto de intencion en accion llevada a cabo por John Searle ha permitido resolver algunas de las principales dificultades a las cuales se venia enfrentando la Teoria Causal de la Accion. No obstante, su teoria impone, simultaneamente, nuevos desafios. Dado lo anterior, el objetivo del presente articulo consiste en revisar algunas de las principales problematicas que presenta la version searleana de la Teoria Causal a la luz de los avances recientes en neurociencia cognitiva de la accion. Particularmente, a partir de la nocion de representacion motora. Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: Some reflections on the Revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the Cognitive Neuroscience of Action. By introducing the concept of intention in action John Searle helped to solve some of the main difficulties faced by the Causal Theory of Action. Yet, his modified theory raises new issues. Given this, the main goal of this article is to review certain problems posed by Searle’s Causal Theory taking into account recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action. Particularly, by using the concept of motor representation. Palabras Claves: Accion intencional; Intencion en accion; Representacion motora; Imagen Motora