Too Light? Too Heavy? Too Medium?, The 2D Infantry Division as a Place for Decisive Operations on the Korean Peninsula.

Abstract : The purpose of this paper is to determine the utility of the 2d Infantry Division as a platform for decisive operations on the Korean Peninsula. Based on an unclassified North Korean campaign plan, a model CFC campaign plan was constructed that placed the 2ID into a role as the theater reserve. Using the doctrinal definition and purpose of an operational reserve, three missions were developed as likely. These missions were then quantified as decisive in nature, using both theory and U.S. doctrine. A force structure, based on J.F.C. Fuller's model of combat effects, is suggested as appropriate for conduct of these missions. Three case studies from the Korean war were then conducted. These case studies all involved division sized operations that were similar in nature to the ones suggested for the 2ID. The vignettes were analyzed and used to quantify the linkage between tactical decisiveness, force structure, and the ability to generate combat effects. Each analysis yielded a slightly different model of decisive force structure. Once complete, the 21 D's force structure could be compared to the models developed. Before final analysis, a rationale is presented as to the suitability of the heavy light division vice a standard heavy or light division to conduct decisive operations in the Korean theater. The conclusion is that the standard heavy or light division lacks either firepower or sufficient infantry to adequately deal with the Korean terrain and enemy. A heavy light mix seems to be the best compromise. The current force structure of the 2ID is then compared to the combat effects shown to be necessary by the historical case studies. It is concluded that the structure of the 2ID is adequate to generate the effects necessary to conduct decisive operations in the Korean theater. Due to heavy dependence on rotary wing aircraft, it is recognized that good flying wea