Agent Pricing Strategy and Energy Using Optimization Based on Stackelberg Game

With the reform and opening up of the power market, the agent plays an important role in electricity management in the residential area. A bi-level model based on Stackelberg game is proposed in this paper, which compromises the interests of both agent and electric vehicle (EV) users. Firstly, the agent’s profit can be maximized by setting a reasonable electricity price to guide the EV charging. Meanwhile, EV users make charging strategies according to the electricity price to minimize the cost. Then, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) and duality theorem are used to transform the proposed model into a mixed integer programming problem, which can be easily solved by commercial solver YALMIP/CPLEX. Finally, the proposed model shows effectiveness and rationality in a specific example. Therefore, it can be expected to provide a novel method for saving the charging cost of EV users and for increasing the profit of the agent.