Hardware Transactional Memory as Anti-analysis Technique for Software Protectors

Software protectors aim to shield executable file against reversing and cracking, by implementing sophisticated mechanisms capable of hiding real binary code and by inserting, inside an executable file, pieces of control code created to reconstruct software to its original state only during execution. This process of hiding and restoring protected bytes is composed by complex code fragments which perform all essential operations, keeping in general a constant structure for all protected software. The goal of this paper is to enhance security of these types of software against crackers, using Hardware Transactional Memories (HTM) by exploiting their features in a way for which they were not designed for. The proposed methodology offers a good level of defence of the protector core part by implementing new specific checks which use hardware processor features, ensuring reliability and a good level of performance with respect to different software implementations and which can be inserted inside a just present chain of checks, enhancing whole programs protection.