U-Auction: Real Utilization Based Truthful Auction Mechanism for Dynamic Spectrum Access

The key challenge in the spectrum auction design is how to efficiently improve the spectrum utilization, which requires leveraging the profit of primary users and the spectrum requirements of secondary users. However, existing spectrum auctions always cause low real spectrum utilization, if some secondary users prefer to monopolize the secondary spectrum access right with high bids which is inconsistent with their true spectrum requirements. To address this problem, through integrating real spectrum utilization, this paper presents a novel real spectrum utili- zation based auction mechanism named U-Auction. This paper provides a framework for auctioneer to leverage the tradeoff between real spectrum utilization and social welfare/revenue. This paper also designs polynomial-time truthful spectrum auction mechanisms to support the auction optimization for both single and multiple channels allocation scenarios in U-Auction. Simulation results show that U-Auction can significantly improve the real spectrum utilization.