Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Structure

Our political system is failing us. Public trust in the national government has plummeted, partisan conflict and gridlock have intensified, and extremist views are gaining traction. We have a president who is more interested in fueling the flames than in putting them out. As dysfunction in Washington increases, many observers fault our constitutional structure. Clearly, things are neither working well, nor working as intended by the founding fathers. This essay for the Book Review issue of the Tulsa Law Review considers three books that analyze different features of the constitutional structure and what they have to say about the need for reform. In the "Dual Executive," Michelle Belco and Brandon Rottinghaus report empirical data on the exercise of executive authority and conclude that existing checks and balances are adequate to protect the public interest from imperial presidents. In "The Federal Judiciary," Richard Posner targets a number of problems with the judicial branch, and he has many ideas to improve the way judges judge. But when it comes to constitutional failures, he generally trusts the Supreme Court to make needed adjustments through its ability to interpret the Constitution in light of contemporary realities. In "Judicial Independence and the American Constitution," Martin Redish also would rely on the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the Constitution, and he suggests some specific ways for the Court to reinforce its power to check and balance.