SO YOU THINK YOU CAN TELL SENSE FROM NONSENSE, REAL DOUBTS FROM SCEPTICAL GAMES

In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between different uses of language as mentioned in On Certainty and his distinction between meaningful, senseless, and nonsense statements in the Tractatus. This comparison has three advantages: first, it allows us to clarify the role of the so-called special propositions in On Certainty; second, it illuminates the relationship between some features of special propositions in On Certainty and the characteristics that define senseless statements in the Tractatus; and, finally, it shows the status of the so-called insight-ful nonsenses in the Tractatus. As a consequence of this argument, I believe in a halfway house between the so-called traditional and new interpretations of Tractatus.