Identity Deception and Game Deterrence via Signaling Games
2016
Maintenance and verication of persistent identities is an
important problem in the area of networking. Particularly,
their critical roles in Wireless Ad-hoc networks (WANETs)
have become even more prominent as they begin to be deployed
in several application domains. In these contexts,
Sybil attacks, making use of replicated deceptive identities,
represent a major challenge for the designers of these networks.
Inspired by biological models of ant colonies and
their dynamics studied via information asymmetric signaling
games, we propose an architecture that can withstand Sybil
attacks, similar to ants, using complex chemical signaling
systems and associated physical actions, naturally `authenticate'
colony members. Here, we present a biomimetic authentication
protocol with mechanisms similar to the physical
processes of chemical diusion, and formalize approaches
to tame the deceptive use of identities; we dub the resulting
game an\identity management signaling game". To consider
network system of nodes, pursuing non-cooperative and deceptive
strategies, we develop an evolutionary game system
allowing cooperative nodes to mutate deceptive strategies.
We empirically study the dynamics using simulation experiments
to select the parameters which aect the overall behaviors.
Through experimentation we consider how an in-
centive package in the form of a shared database can impact
system behavior.
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