Suffering for the Suffering of the Other: A Levinasian Approach to Immigration

Rather than trying to justify pain and suffering in terms of a general theory of necessity in which individual pain becomes intelligible and senseful only in the narrative of the whole, as in Leibniz’ Theodicy , Emmanuel Levinas asserts that suffering is “useless.” Against theodicy, Levinas defends the insurmountable futility and absurdity of pain, a paradigmatic example of which is found in the concentration camps. We must therefore choose, Levinas asserts, either theodicy or ethics. This approach makes the subject very significant, since it encourages activity and responsibility in the face of a possible passivity and indifference towards others. This approach makes the subject very significant, since it encourages activity and responsibility instead of passivity and indifference towards others. In trying to understand how to restore meaning to suffering, Levinas offers a typology of the sources of suffering: sins of commission, sins of omission, and suffering the other’s suffering because of love. In order to illustrate the ethical dynamics of suffering, we analyze the contemporary situation of immigration, rejecting the case for open borders as failing to offer a restitution for the suffering caused. Keywords: Levinas. Theodicy. Ethics. Suffering. Vulnerability. Immigration. DOI: 10.7176/JPCR/49-05 Publication date: June 30th 2020