Responses to Stoljar, Weatherson and Boghossian

Stoljar is right that my approach to the Knowledge Argument (KA) might be described as a version of what he calls ' the self-locating (or indexical) response ', but I regard that response more as a strategy than as an argument. The argument that Stoljar describes is something like this: The AA (an argument analogous to the KA that concerns indexical knowledge) seems to be of the same form as the KA, and the premise seems as plausible. But the AA is unpersuasive, so we should find the KA unpersuasive as well. As an argument against the KA, this is pretty lame. A satisfactory response to the AA that rejects its conclusion must say where it goes wrong. But the indexical strategy might be put this way: If the AA is manifestly unpersuasive, it ought to be easy to say what its mistake is. Perhaps the explanation of where that argument goes wrong will help us to locate an analogous problem with the KA. But this strategy does not yield a response to the KA until one has explained what is wrong with the AA. I think one can explain this, and that the analogy is also of more general interest. Both arguments concern a kind of knowledge that is in some sense essentially subjective. The more general hope is that the analogy will help to clarify what this might mean. And I also hoped that the analogy might be helpful in both directions: not just to clarify distinctively phenomenal information