Successfully Mutual Cooperative Collective Action: Principle of Institutional Arrangement of the Aflaj Irrigation System in Sultanate of Oman

To investigate the present of the two most common analytical tools; heterogeneity and homogeneity over a mutual cooperative in an irrigation system, we considered both of these in an attempt to find an existing mutual cooperative over aflaj (singular falaj) in Oman. In an aflaj community defined-boundary shareholders group, we expect some sort of equal size distribution by which all members interested in cooperative mutual collective action with regard to system maintenance, extra water renting right, and water flow reliability. We provided the necessary demonstration of the existing institutional arrangement to further prove the theory. Although fast body of literatures discussed these rules and cooperative with the different types of the common-pool resources, this study focus over the cooperative collective action, in particular investigate the presence of cooperative collective action within the Omani ancient-aflaj system (singular falaj). In Oman, aflaj water allocation and its institutional arrangement showed relatively resilient against recent regional development. Today, in many aflaj communities, common administrative as well as allocative water delivery processes were found over almost identical structural social hierarchy. While the documented Omani measuring unit, known as ather, (based on time) indicated the first condition of the present of cooperative collective action, another associated water auctioning which used to generate income, (known as rub’ah (quarter)) has been found.