Evolution of cooperation in the multigame on a two-layer square network

Abstract It is a thorny problem to explain the origin and prosperity of cooperation in nature and society. Evolutionary games develop a solid theoretical framework for exploring the formation of cooperation. Considering the complexity of individual social relations and the diversity of game types, we investigate the spread of cooperation in an environment where each agent has the same probability to play the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game in a two-layer square network. It is concluded that the introduction of multigame is conducive to the enhancement of cooperation, and the coupling between the two sublayers of the network is conditional in favoring cooperation. Moreover, the conclusions are further confirmed in the multigame model including the snowdrift game and the stag hunt game. Since this research framework is closer to reality, we hope that the discussion of the diffusion of cooperation here will provide inspiration for the future research of cooperation in the context of multiple complex environments.