Reciprocal reward promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

Abstract Reciprocal reward, as a common phenomenon in nature and society, plays a pivotal role in interpreting the existence and maintenance of cooperation. In this work, we introduce a reciprocal reward mechanism in the two pairwise models including the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift games, where a cooperative agent with cooperative neighbors will obtain additional bonuses. Under this mechanism, we find that the evolution of cooperation is promoted to a high level. The promoting effects for the demonstrated results are independent of the applied spatial network structures and the potential evolutionary game models, and thus showing a high degree of generality. In addition, we also probe into the impact of the initial fractions of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation under this mechanism, the results of which further confirm the robustness of this mechanism. Our research may provide valuable insights into interpreting the emergence and sustainability of cooperation and thus are beneficial for resolving social dilemmas.