Cognitive bias and irrational belief as predictors of avoidance

Abstract Cognitive bias, i.e. overestimates of subjective probability and cost of catastrophic events, and irrational belief were explored as predictors of avoidance. Three groups—anxiety disordered clients, a mixed group of clinic outpatients, and normals—were administered several self-report inventories. Multiple regression analyses were used to investigate a modified version of the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire, the Belief Scale, and the Body Sensations Questionnaire as predictors of avoidance, as measured by the Mobility Inventory. It was hypothesized that frequency × probability × cost of catastrophic cognitions (and the occurrence of the events they represent) would be a better predictor of avoidance than frequency alone. It was also hypothesized that irrational thinking would be a significant predictor of avoidance. The results generally supported the hypotheses, with subjective probability emerging as a particularly potent predictor of avoidance. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.