Litigation on Public Contract Performance. A Comparative Study of the Treatment of Additional Costs and Contract Equilibrium by Administrative Judge in the United States and France

Comparative law applied to public contracts usually concentrates more on the tendering process than on performance issues. This Article focuses on the latter : it deals with cases in which performance of public contracts in the United States and France leads to litigation. The Article's objectives are threefold : first, to synthesize the findings of an empirical analysis of the sources and nature of performance issues that lead to litigation before administrative courts (namely, the General Services Board of Contract Appeals and the Cours administratives d'Appel and the Conseil d'Etat); second, to provide an analysis of the way in which American and French administrative judges tackle and decide contract cases ; and third, to broaden the perspective in order to provide a more comprehensive comparative analysis of the legal context in which regulation, case law, and the styles of administrative judges' reasoning affect the treatment of additional costs and contract equilibrium issues in both countries.