Fiscal Law, Incremental Funding, and Conditional Contracts.

Abstract : This thesis discusses problems caused in government procurement by the annual budget cycle, appropriations process, and the legal and policy limitations placed on the use of appropriations. In particular, the limitations placed on the use of appropriations limit the most effective competitive procurement practices, because some potential suppliers hesitate to enter the government market for supplies and services or to commit capital because funding levels have been uncertain, and because economies of scale have often been unobtainable due to restrictions placed on the use of annual funds. These limitations also have hampered the effort of federal agencies to develop and retain suppliers, to foster competition to secure the lowest prices, to supply long leadtime items and to preserve the industrial base to meet mobilization needs. This thesis is intended to develop the theoretical and practical interface between fiscal law principles and government procurement law principles. It discusses the contracting techniques the agencies have developed to cope with the slowness and limited nature of appropriations, especially in cases in which agencies have real needs but either none or only part of the appropriations required to satisfy that need.