Autoconhecimento, introspecção e memória

The paper addresses the operative place of memory in self-knowledge. Making use of classic references, particularly those stemming from the dispute between empiricism and rationalism, it aims to show that knowledge of the own self, which is only attainable by introspection, is relatively poor. Opposing dual structures of presentation of the problem, the paper suggests that the clarification of what can be considered self-knowledge and introspection requires the consideration of the role played by memory and the evaluation of the epistemic nature of postdictions (i.e., statements about past events in this case, about mental past events). By way of non-definitive conclusion, distinguishing self-knowledge from self-knowledge by introspection, the paper claims that self-knowledge by introspection has at least three characteristics: it has a dual temporal structure based on memory, it is direct, and it has first-person authority.