The Changing Political Economy of Japan's Economic Relations with Russia: The Rise and Fall of Seikei Fukabun

IN RECENT YEARS it has become virtually de riguer for writers to open discussions of Russo-Japanese relations with the observation that frigid diplomatic relations between the two countries stemming from historical animosities and the territorial dispute over the Southern Kurile Islands (the Northern Territories) have prevented the consummation of what might otherwise be a highly lucrative and complementary economic relationship. Only when the territorial issue is resolved, it is implied, can their economic relations hope to attain their rich potential. Without denying the importance of the Northern Territories issue and historical animosities in shaping Russo-Japanese relations, the following article attempts to build a case for the argument that a resolution of the bilateral territorial dispute may not necessarily be a prerequisite for a significant deepening of the bilateral economic relationship or, for that matter, greaterJapanese economic assistance. It does this by moving away from a monolithic 'Japan, Inc. "-type model of Japanese foreign economic policy making. 'Japan" is disaggregated into several subnational actors whose concerns and interests diverge and who tend to operate in relatively independent political and economic policy spheres. By doing so, the paper hopes to show that Japan's so-called "non-separation of economics and politics" (seikeifukabun) approach to Soviet/Russo-Japanese relations has been the product of a distinctive conjuncture of forces that is currently eroding. In turn, this erosion, facilitated by sociopolitical changes in Russia, is transforming the political economy of Russo-Japanese economic relations. Part 1 of the article presents an overview of Japan-Soviet economic relations prior to the rise of seikei fukabun and introduces the key actors