THE PHILADELPHIA NATIONAL BANK DOCTRINE A VERIFICATION

I am sure that by this time you are all more than familiar with the arguments which have been advanced in the lively debate over merger standards which has taken place since the Supreme Court in its Philadelphia National Bank opinion held that proof of increased concentration was sufficient to establish, at least prima facie, the illegality of a horizontal merger. Some critics of the Court have seen this approach as an unfortunate rejection of the Rule of Reason. They would concede no general relevance to economic theories of oligopolistic behavior and would require the courts to weigh what they rather loosely refer to as "all relevant factors " in making a prediction of the competitive consequences of any particular merger. Other critics recognize the relevance of market concentration as a basis for predicting competitive behavior but would have the courts consider the effects of other structural characteristics or weigh in the balance the possible economies resulting from a merger. Still others and most recently Professor Galbraith have suggested that antitrust enforcement is a " charade " and that the concern of these laws with increases in concentration has served merely to retard the development of larger firms needed to meet the demands of a modern economy.