Air Base Attacks and Defensive Counters: Historical Lessons and Future Challenges

Abstract : In the past decade, U.S. national security policymakers and defense analysts have given increasing attention to the problem of adversary anti-access and area-denial strategies. These strategies are intended to inhibit U.S. political and operational access to and disrupt U.S. operations in key regions. A central feature of adversary anti-access strategies is capabilities designed to disrupt the operation of U.S. and partner-nation forward air bases. Although emerging systems, such as precision standoff systems, present new challenges to air base operations, attacks on air bases are nothing novel, dating back to the opening months of World War I. In the past century, air base attacks have been common in both small and large wars; specialized tactics and systems have been developed for offensive operations against adversary bases and for the defense of friendly bases. To better understand this policy problem and explore the relative effectiveness of potential solutions, RAND Project AIR FORCE has conducted a series of assessments over recent years exploring historical, political, and operational aspects of the access problem. This report is designed to complement these more-operational and technical analyses which are generally not available to the general public, media, and academic communities. The objective is to better inform the public debate on this important policy problem. This report is also intended as a reference for those military planners, strategists, war-college students, and other defense professionals who have not yet had an opportunity to delve deeply into the topic. It presents an overview of the problem, describes the history of air base attacks and defensive counters, and broadly explores emerging challenges and options to enhance the future operability of air bases.