An Attempt to Learn Inequality to Unlearn Equality

The longing for justice is human beings’ most explicit desire. A social order based on conceptualised form of equality has always brought the scepticism of whether a conceptualisation of equality is ever going to avert inequality in any society. If such a concept fails to regulate the behaviour of members of society, in a way, that is acceptable and satisfactory to all, then such society cannot claim to be a just social order. This paper will attempt to give importance to understand inequality for different societies on different set of social facts, unique to that society based on which any reliance on universal acceptance of a concept of equality can be dismissed. An attempt towards universal conceptualisation of equality has hitherto always failed because it has the shortcoming of not pre-empting every fact situation of future that is yet to occur. Au contraire if only inequalities based on prejudices and discriminatory practices of a particular society are expressly enumerated either by way of practice or social admission of existence of such inequality, then maybe it will be more appropriate to avoid injustice due to unequal treatment. It is a challenge to convince that any social or legal order can achieve at least a procedurally just system if it continuously reminds itself of glaring inequalities which are indigenously part of its social order or generally a prejudice that exists without detection. The paper attempts to establish focus on knowing inequalities, unique and indigenous to the particular order rather than conceptualising equality. This method may succeed, at least qualitatively, to identify and omit inequality from the existing social and legal order. It does not challenge the hierarchy, rather it accepts and assimilates it to remove the inequalities of opportunity and provision. Ultimate questions of structure are raised for displacing equality as the central knowable for achieving a just society. Is it easier to know inequality within a social order then to know what equality is. If the policy makers and the adjudicators of a society are certain of inequalities, rather than being perplexed with the uncertainty of equality, will we have a just social and legal order? The paper hypothesises to look at the probable solution of knowing inequality than to perpetually attempt to conceptualise equality. No doubt, the collective conscience of society is stimulated by the idea of equality, but to identify inequality on the basis of existent prejudices and divisions within, is an easier task. If anyone as an individual puts himself/herself in the fact situation, the apparent identification of inequality is easily perceivable. The objective of this paper is to put across the idea of ease of identifying inequality rather than turn a blind eye with the admission of non-feasibility to achieve equality for all.