One governance theory to rule them all? The case for a paradoxical approach to co-operative governance

Abstract Despite their importance in the global economy, co-operatives are still understudied by governance experts and misunderstood by the general public. However, their purpose, ownership and decision-making and profit-sharing structures make co-operatives very different from their corporate, investor-owned counterparts. This article draws on existing literature to describe the specificities of co-operatives and argues in favour of governance theories and practices appropriate to this organizational model. Based on a member-centred conceptualization of co-operatives – as member-owned, member-controlled and member-benefiting – we highlight seven paradoxes specific to co-operative governance and show the limits of traditional theories and practices in coping with these paradoxes. We argue in favour of implementing governance models that both reinforce the co-operative identity and increase the economic and social benefits of co-operatives.