Inviting judicial review: A comprehensive analysis of Canadian appellate court reference cases

Canadian reference questions allow the executive (both federal and provincial) to obtain an advisory judicial opinion from a provincial appellate court or the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of government legislation, either proposed or enacted, in the absence of a live legal dispute. The reference procedure allows governments to insert the courts and the judiciary into often highly contentious and normative partisan debates. The process of reference questions in Canada raises several heretofore unexplored questions, such as: Why would political actors delegate a portion of their decision making power to the courts in these episodes? Is government participation in reference cases evidence of strategic litigation? This project is driven by the central question: why do governments ask reference questions? In answering this research question, this study argues that the use of Canadian reference power cases demonstrates a delegation of decision-making that offers governments several unique advantages: initiating a reference provides governments a means to deal with political controversies, references can help governments deal with issues associated with federalism, references provide the ability to overcome time/resource limitations associated with routine litigation, references provide the opportunity to benefit from the institutional authority of the courts, and references allow governments to take advantage of the opportunity to initiate abstract review. This analysis demonstrates that the actual outcome of a reference case – win or lose – is almost secondary to the political benefits that can be attained from simply involving the courts through the reference power. This dissertation makes a significant contribution to the field through a novel analysis of all Canadian appellate court reference cases from 1875 to 2014, which is complemented with interview data and archival research.%%%%Au Canada, les renvois relatifs permettent l'executif (federal ou provincial) d'obtenir, en absence d'un litige reel, un avis juridique consultatif sur la constitutionnalite d'une legislation gouvernementale, soit proposee ou adoptee, d'une cour d'appel provinciale ou la Cour supreme du Canada. Le processus de renvois relatifs permet aux gouvernements d'impliquer les tribunaux et le systeme judiciaire dans des debats partisans, qui sont souvent tres controversees et normatives. Ce processus suscite plusieurs questions jusqu'ici inexplorees : Pourquoi les acteurs politiques delegueraient-ils une partie de leur pouvoir decisionnel aux tribunaux ? La participation gouvernementale dans les renvois relatifs est-elle preuve du litige strategique ? Ce projet est axe sur une question principale: pourquoi les gouvernements soumettent-ils des renvois relatifs ? Cette etude demontre que le pouvoir de demander un renvoi relatif est en effet une delegation du pouvoir decisionnel qui confere aux gouvernements des avantages uniques. Cette delegation fournit aux gouvernements un moyen d'eviter des controverses politiques, aide ceux-ci…