On the Interplay between Self-Driving Cars and Public Transportation

Cities worldwide struggle with overloaded transportation systems and their externalities, such as traffic congestion and emissions. The emerging autonomous transportation technology has a potential to alleviate these issues. Yet, the decisions of profit-maximizing operators running large autonomous fleets could have a negative impact on other stakeholders, e.g., by disproportionately cannibalizing public transport, and therefore could make the transportation system even less efficient and sustainable. A careful analysis of these tradeoffs requires modeling the main modes of transportation, including public transport, within a unified framework. In this paper, we propose such a framework, which allows us to study the interplay among mobility service providers, public transport authorities, and customers. Our framework combines a graph-theoretic network model for the transportation system with a game-theoretic market model in which mobility service providers are profit-maximizers, while customers select individually-optimal transportation options. We apply our framework to data for the city of Berlin, Germany, and present sensitivity analyses to study parameters that mobility service providers or municipalities can influence to steer the system. We show that depending on market conditions and policy restrictions, autonomous ride-hailing systems may complement or cannibalize a public transportation system, serving between 7% and 80% of all customers. We discuss the main factors behind differences in these outcomes as well as strategic design options available to policymakers. Among others, we show that the monopolistic and the competitive cases yield similar modal shares, but differ in the profit outcome of each mobility service provider.